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Introduction 
Ever since the establishment of the Israeli state, the internal political situation between 
the Arab minority and the Jewish majority has not been stable. For Palestinian Arabs in Israel, 
their condition is characterized by socio-political tensions instituted by the Israeli regime. On the 
last day of the British mandate over historic Palestine, the Israeli state was established. The 
state’s establishment was followed by a Declaration of Independence. In the Declaration of 
Independence, it was ‘legislated’ that all inhabitants of the state are going to be treated equally 
by granting each and every citizen with social and political rights which, in a section from the 
Declaration, was explicitly stated as follows:   
The state of Israel will be open for Jewish immigration and for the Ingathering of the 
Exiles; it will foster the development of the country for the benefit of all its inhabitants; it 
will be based on freedom, justice and peace as envisaged by the prophets of Israel; it will 
ensure complete equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of 
religion, race or sex; it will guarantee freedom of religion, conscience, language, 
education and culture; it will safeguard the Holy Places of all religions; and it will be 
faithful to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.1  
Although the aforementioned extract was included in, arguably, Israel’s most precious 
document, which is an ostensibly binding piece of ‘legislation’ used as the basis for the 
application of law, the liberal and democratic content of the Declaration was blatantly 
disregarded in its widespread implementation. This is because, in Israel there is no separation 
between religion and nationality. Thus, Israel cannot be classified as an open, liberal democracy. 
The content of the Declaration of Independence would hold true only if the Jewish state would 
                                               
1 Ben-Gurion, David et al. "Declaration of Establishment of State of Israel." Israel  
     Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel, 14 May 1948, www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/ 
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transform into an Israeli state where ethnicity would be privatized and a new “all-Israeli identity, 
nationalism and nation were to emerge.”2  
This aforementioned claim, asserted by Sammy Smooha, one of Israel’s leading 
sociologists, in his book “Ethnic Democracy: Israel as an Archetype,” suggests that if the Arabs 
in Israel would denounce their Palestinian identity, they would be the citizens that Israel not only 
wants but in fact legislates them to be, and it would grant them rights which would put them on 
an equal footing with the Jewish citizens. The Arab Palestinian citizens of Israel are provided 
with a platform for assimilation into the Israeli state under the guise of a distorted notion of 
integration. Therefore, they cannot entirely integrate regardless of their desire to do so or 
otherwise, because it is not only the Jewish nature of the state that prevents them but also, and 
more importantly, it is the monologic understanding of ‘integration’ by the state that would 
require Arabs in Israel to sacrifice their socio-historically Palestinian facet of their identity in the 
name of purported integration. The broader claim of this paper, as articulated above, argues that 
prior to the process of integration of the Arabs in Israel, facilitated under the Israeli regime, the 
retooling of the definition of integration itself is indispensable so as to preserve the Palestinian 
component of the Arab identity within Israel. This paper, using Anton Shammas, Sayed Kashua 
and Lucy Aharish, three Arab artists who were able to occupy the Israeli artistic space, illustrates 
that artistic expression is the only medium where the rights of the Arabs in Israel cannot be 
seized by the far-reaching grasp of legislation. By placing the three figures in a form of a literary 
triptych, the manner in which their art, which varied in its form, shared the common ability to 
engender dialogue within the divided Israeli society, underlines the necessity of dialogue in order 
to reevaluate the definition of integration. Artistic dialogue serves three purposes: to generate 
                                               
2 Smooha, Sammy. "Ethnic Democracy: Israel as an Archetype." Israel Studies 2.2 (1997): 202. 
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informed conversation between the Arabs and the Jews in relation to integration; to revise the 
Israeli form of ‘integration’ which is in fact socio-political assimilation; and finally, to highlight 
the fact that integration, when viewed as a dialogic process, between the concerned groups, is 
mirrored in the dialogue between artist and reader/spectator which should be transposed to the 
political relationship between the representatives of the Arabs and the Jews.   
The majority of the Arab public in Israel, which includes the political leaders, recognize 
the state of Israel and its institutions. This seemingly counter-intuitive acknowledgment of an 
oppressive authority in fact demonstrates their willingness to allow for administrative 
mechanisms required for a state to function despite the fact that this acknowledgment has been a 
result of subjugation as opposed to cordial reception from the regime. We can observe that 
through their participation in politics and the Knesset3 elections, the Arabs are desperately 
seeking to be active members of the parliamentary process in order to safeguard their interests. 
However, the majority of Arabs does not recognize and accept that Israel is the exclusive 
homeland of the Jews, and view Zionism as a racist and discriminatory movement.4 By 
recognizing the state of Israel as solely the Jewish Homeland, the Arabs relinquish their rights as 
the indigenous people of the land, and deny their fellow Palestinians in the diaspora from the 
right of return.  
Over the last few decades there was a national awakening and revival of the Palestinian 
identity and the Arabs in Israel started demanding that Israel become a “state for all its citizens”.5 
Hence, the question arises: What do the Arabs want ? The Arab public is anti-Zionist, regards 
                                               
3 Knesset is the Hebrew word for parliament which functions in Israel.  
4 Smooha, Sammy. "Ethnic Democracy: Israel as an Archetype." Israel Studies 2.2 (1997): 209. 
5 Peleg, Ilan, and Dov Waxman. "Palestinian Politics in a Jewish State, The 1990s and 2000s: A New 
Agenda." Israel's Palestinians the Conflict within. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2011. 62. 
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Zionism as a racist movement and demands for the state of Israel to denounce its Jewish 
exclusivity so they can, as non-Jews, be equal citizens.6 The critical and, frankly, more pressing 
question is: What do the Jews want? The Jewish majority prefers Zionist dominance to preserve 
the Jewish State, rather than preserving democracy in Israel - the majority of Jews in Israel prefer 
the ethnic-national Jewish character to its liberal component.7 From here, we see that the 
collective identity for the Arabs, which is composed of a historical Palestinian identity and 
Israeli citizenship, is enmeshed in a difficult and tense situation that the two inextricably linked 
socio-historical components will live together as long as the Palestinian issue at large does not 
come to a resolution. 
The State of Israel was proved to be undemocratic when it came to deal with its Arab 
minority. The state implements the principle of equality before the law by setting up mechanisms 
to not only ensure Jewish supremacy but also sustain it.  We can appoint several key areas in 
which these mechanisms are seen, such as immigration and citizenship, land and settlements, 
security, sharing and distribution of investments for development that will be delineated in the 
course of the paper. Furthermore, in terms of the country's culture - it is clear that there is a 
dichotomous relationship between one superior culture and the other inferior culture.8 
Israel ensures individual civil rights for its citizens. In this aspect, Arabs have, through 
the gaze of an external observer, ‘sufficient’ equality and enjoy the right to vote and be elected to 
parliament - these ‘rights’ are the extent to their ostensibly equal status disregarding their 
collective property rights or rights to an education that have not been filtered through the lens of 
                                               
6 Smooha, Sammy. "Ethnic Democracy: Israel as an Archetype." Israel Studies 2.2 (1997): 209 
7Ibid., 207. 
8  Ravid, Barak. "Romney Outrages Palestinians by Suggesting Israeli Culture Is Superior." Haaretz. 
2012. Web. 
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the Israeli government. However, when the question of the rights of the Israeli community as 
collective surfaces, it is clear that there is a Jewish Zionist consensus that denies the possibility 
to change the character of the state. Arabs are categorically excluded in terms of their collective 
rights, as noted above, because they are not recognized to be a national minority, so they do not 
fulfill the ‘criterion’ to deserve collective political rights.9 In spite of the fact that they receive 
certain individual rights, Israeli law distinguishes between Jews and non-Jews with regard to 
immigration. The Law of Return, as stated in the Declaration of Independence, grants automatic 
immigration and citizenship rights to any Jew in the world. Palestinian Arabs do not have such 
rights. 
The rhetoric of political rights utilized to talk about Arab Palestinians’ rights, employs 
words such as citizenship and immigration. Although I have acknowledged this above, it is 
precisely to deviate from this kind of misleading rhetoric which implies that my people are 
considered as outsiders who need to secure a legal means of political identity in a land that is in 
fact native to them. Therefore, the conceptual scheme that must define the Arab Palestinians’ 
rights is one of integration, not assimilation. Given the fact that the Palestinians in Israel are the 
indigenous people, the rationale grounding Israel’s decision to apply the model of assimilation to 
their socio-political condition is fallacious. This is due to the fact that assimilation is usually 
applied to immigrants that are entering a host country, not to indigenous people.10 The working 
definition of integration, which will serve as the basis of the argument in this paper, requires a 
reorientation of integration, from a unidirectional notion, to a two way process, that necessitates 
                                               
9 Peleg, Ilan, and Dov Waxman. Israel's Palestinians: The Conflict within. New York: Cambridge UP, 
2011. 115.  
10 Alba, Richard, and Victor Nee. “Assimilation.” An Introduction to Immigrant Incorporation Studies: 
European Perspectives, edited by Marco Martiniello and Jan Rath, Amsterdam University Press, ( 2014): 
54. 
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dialogue from both Jews and Arabs to compromise and work together in order to fulfill the 
model of a “Melting Pot,” which will be explained in a forthcoming section in this paper.  
Arab Palestinians in Israel are often referred to as the “ticking bomb”. This incendiary 
rhetoric became more prominent with the rise of the second Palestinian Intifada in 2000.  Effi 
Eitam, the leader of the right-wing National Religious Party (NPR) and then Minister of Housing 
in Prime Minister Sharon’s government, expressed his opinion in an interview on March 22, 
2002 as following: “I say that the Arabs in Israel overall are a bomb that is going to explode 
beneath the entire democratic system in Israel. […] The Arabs in Israel are turning into a fifth 
column […]. We need to consider whether Israel’s democracy can continue to enable this public 
to go on taking part in it […]. Arabs in Israel are a dangerous fifth column, like a cancer.”11  
Another instance of this inflammatory rhetoric manifests in Historian, Benny Morris’ interview 
with Ha’aretz: “The Israeli Arabs are a time bomb. Their slide into complete Palestinization has 
made them an emissary of the enemy that is among us. They are a potential fifth column. In both 
demographic and security terms they are liable to undermine the state.”12 Consequently, 
Palestinians in Israel, in terms of their capacity to participate, within the political realm, as well 
as the preservation of their national identity, is circumscribed by the perception of the Palestinian 
community as a “ticking time bomb and… a fifth column”. The juxtaposition of the images, one 
of impending explosion which may be viewed as a Palestinian backlash to the oppressive nature 
of the government’s policy, and the other of stasis - relating to the inability to physically drive 
out the ‘column’ that is the Palestinian community as well as the socio-political stasis caused by 
the stalemate between both peoples,’ translates into the regime’s stance in relation to Palestinian 
                                               
11 Peleg, Ilan, and Dov Waxman. Israel's Palestinians: The Conflict within. New York: Cambridge UP, 
2011. 115.  
12 Ari Shavit, “Survival of the Fittest? An Interview with Benny Morris,” Ha’aretz, January 9, 2004. 
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integration or rather the lack thereof. The underlying fears for the Israeli government are the 
implications of Palestinian integration as a process that will not only unify the community but 
also become a source of formidable resistance to the state’s unchecked power.  Nevertheless, the 
Palestinians, with the idea of being viewed as a ticking bomb, can absorb the power of the 
derogatory image in order to be the agents of socio-political upheaval in order to, not spread 
further violence or injury, but to, simply, secure their collective rights in their homeland.  
The understanding of the term integration that leads to the so called, coexistence is 
somehow problematic. Integration, as re-conceptualized by Michael Fix, the president of the 
Migration Policy Institute in the U.S, is a two way process where there are cross influences from 
both the cultures and both posture themselves in a manner that allows for coexistence rather than 
the preservation of a state of deep-seated polarization and socio-cultural tension.13 This is a 
process that requires acceptance of the laws and ways of the host country by the people of the 
minority culture without having to relinquish their own laws and ways which is tantamount to a 
disposal of their cultural and national identity. This happens with modification in both the 
cultures.14 Both Israelis and Arabs, in order to reach a political consensus, require collaboration 
so as to reach a middle ground where the two standpoints are shared, through dialogue, as 
opposed to delivered in the form for a set of demands. Thus, Israel has to accept the Palestinian 
identity of its Arab citizens and not treat them with suspicion when they embrace this identity so 
as to truly exemplify the democratic state it purports itself to be.15 This is because Israel, on the 
one hand, asks its Palestinian citizens to be active citizens, engaged community members and 
claims that it wants them to participate in the discourse of Israeli political, social and cultural 
                                               
13 Securing the Future: U.S. Immigrant Integration Policy: A Reader. Edited by Michael Fix, 
Washington, DC. Migration Policy Institute, 2007. 192. 
14Ibid. 
15 Smooha, Sammy. "Ethnic Democracy: Israel as an Archetype." Israel Studies 2.2 (1997): 209. 
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life.16 On the other hand, it considers acts of any type of commemoration of Palestinian history 
and identity as acts of terrorism and provocation. Israel must accept that both, loyal Israeli 
citizenship and the embracing of Palestinian identity can intertwine which therefore allows and 
provides a platform for its Arab citizens to integrate. This is exemplified by the fact that when an 
individual like Anton Shammas, a Palestinian writer that writes only in Hebrew, who represents 
one of the most important figures and examples of integration amongst Palestinian Arabs in 
Israel, is perceived as a threat.17 It leaves the fundamental definition of integration in Israel at 
stake. Shammas not only mastered the Hebrew language and Jewish history, but also dedicated 
most of his literary work to try and invent an Israeli society rather than a Jewish society in Israel. 
His work is seen by many people and important figures in Israel as a threat to the state. This is 
because in his work, he is trying to de-judaize the Hebrew language and make it less exclusive.  
Sayed Kashua, is another Palestinian Israeli writer that adopted the Hebrew language to 
be his language and medium of expression. Kashuas’ style of writing is different from 
Shammas’, as it is colloquial and “trendy,” thereby allowing for his artistic reach to be far larger 
than Shammas’. In Israel, people know him predominantly from Avoda Aravit (2007), or in 
English, Arab Labor. Arab Labor is a satirical bilingual TV series written by Kashua. The series 
focuses on the life of Amjad Alyean, a Palestinian journalist and Israeli citizen in search of his 
identity. Satirising the cultural divide, Kashua and his characters play on religious, cultural and 
political differences to daringly depict the mixed society that is in Israel. This show marked a 
milestone on Israeli television as the first program to present Palestinian characters speaking 
Arabic on primetime, and it generated great controversy between the Arab and Israeli media.  
                                               
16Ibid., 205. 
17 Hever, Hannan, and Orin D. Gensler. “Hebrew in an Israeli Arab Hand: Six Miniatures on Anton 
Shammas's ‘Arabesques.’” Cultural Critique, 7, (1987): 50 .  
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The third character, who constitutes the last panel of this triptych, is Lucy Aharish. 
Aharish is an Arab-Israeli who, unlike Shammas and Kashua, does not identify as Palestinian. 
Aharish is one of the most prominent characters on Israeli media; she is a journalist and a news 
broadcaster that was one of the honorees invited in 2015 to light the torch of independence on 
Mount Herzl. The public committee that chose the torch lighters remarked that they were 
selected “because they achieved extraordinary and inspiring achievements, and made a 
significant contribution to Israeli excellence and innovation”.18 Aharish is often referred to by 
Israeli Jews as the “good Arab”, and Arabs in Israel are repeatedly asked, why can’t they be like 
Lucy Aharish, the good - “well integrated Arab”.19 
These three characters, despite the differences between them, use art as their medium to 
express their frustration and their demands, not specified in terms seen in United Nations’ 
resolutions, rather in calls to socio-political action involving dialogue between the Arabs and 
Jews. Art has shown itself to serve as an effective way to create integration and understand the 
new conception of it by allowing the readers and spectators to dialogue with their work as 
opposed to being subjected to impersonal laws that are produced by the regime. The limitations 
that the state policy imposes on the Arabs when it comes to the expression of their identity, are 
suffocating. Therefore, the content of the art that is created can reach the people and the world, 
beyond state policies and barriers. It creates a new space to inspire dialogue about integration; to 
promote the revision and understanding of the term itself as a two-way process rather than an 
                                               
18 Beck, Jonathan, Cathryn J. Prince, Daniel Estrin, Times Of Israel Staff, Afp, Times of Israel Staff and 
AP, Tamar Pileggi and AP, Andrew Silow-Carroll, Jta, Judah Ari Gross, Alexander Fulbright, Eric 
Cortellessa, and Sue Surkes. "‘This Is Our Country, There Is No Other,’ Says Teary-eyed Aharish in 
Arabic." The Times of Israel. N.p., 22 Apr. 2015. 
19 Levy, Gideon. "In Israel, a Good Arab Is an Invisible Arab." Haaretz. N.p., 11 Mar. 2015.  
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ultimatum declared by the state that opposes a process which involves negotiation. The artistic 
space, as reflected by the composition of the triptych with the three characters in this paper, 
highlights the need for a polyvalence of voices in order to not only tackle the problem of 
integration but to also first, and critically for the future of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, reorient 
the understanding of integration as a dialogic process democratized by the space of the artistic 
expression.   
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Key Terms  
The understanding of the concept of the “Melting Pot” in Israel, as theorized by Ephraim 
Ya’ar a Sociology professor at the Tel Aviv University not only illustrates the regime’s 
conception of integration but also highlights the need for a meticulous reevaluation and 
subsequent revision of the distorted notion of integration and its practicalities. There is often 
confusion in the usage of the terms ‘integration’ and ‘assimilation’ present across scholarly 
practice leading to, at times, the use of the terms interchangeably. The regime, in line with the 
interchangeability of the two terms, puts forth an agenda of integration under the guise of a 
process that is in actuality assimilation. In other words, the Arab citizens are forced to adopt the 
mechanisms of the state’s apparatus whilst diminishing their own national identity in order to be 
part of the pernicious “Melting Pot”.   
Melting Pot was arguably one of the most important projects declared by the Zionist 
movement.20 However, the model of the Melting Pot did not work in Israel. It is noteworthy that, 
considering the idea of a Melting Pot as an intermingling of multifarious socio-historical 
identities, the diction of chemical reactions is employed as it is germane to both the 
comprehension of the metaphor but also is apt to its manifestation within the society in question. 
The Melting Pot failed in Israel because it dismissed some of the most distinctive aspects that 
form the final product of the Melting Pot, which is going to be referred to as the ‘compound’. 
The Melting Pot is observed when groups of immigrants come to a country and contribute 
different things; following the influx of the groups, it would be hard to discern the differences 
                                               
20 Ya’ar, Ephraim. “Continuity and Change in Israeli Society: The Test of the Melting Pot.” Israel Studies 
10. 2 ( 2005): 91.  
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between the various communities without them having to relinquish their initial identities.21 The 
so called ‘compound’ of the Melting Pot is formed when a variety of elements and substances are 
mixed together. They are broken down and dissolved until they are brought to a new state which 
represents a purportedly ‘common’ solution of all these different substances, while still able to 
‘recognize’ each of the substances separately. When talking about a Melting Pot in a political 
state, this solution allows the substances to mix together and form a new compound that has 
distinctive attributes of its own.22 This model failed in Israel because the final compound that it 
was seeking from the Melting Pot was one from its already existing substances, put in the pot 
before the process of amalgamation. This substance stands for no other than the Ashkenazi Jew 
which was the Israeli ethos, to force other groups to assimilate into the Ashkenazi European 
consensus. 
The Arabs were not the only group that, in the face of the Melting Pot, were mistreated so 
as to form the ‘compound’ without adulterating its essence.. The Sephardic and Mizrahi Jews 
faced difficulties as well. They arrived in Israel en masse during the early 1950s, and were 
automatically sent to development areas like Dimona in the Negev and Kiryat Shmona in the 
North. Despite this immediate geographical displacement and partition, they could still fit into 
the collective Israeli consensus because of their Jewish ‘essence’. Palestinian nationalism and 
Israeli citizenship shape the collective identity of the Arab community. There is a new collective 
identity that has emerged among Arab citizens in Israel, distinct from that of Palestinians 
elsewhere. It’s the identity of “Palestinians in Israel.” Smooha says that the hybrid identity that is 
slowly emerging and spreading among Arabs is the self-identification as ‘Palestinians in Israel’. 
                                               
21Ibid., 93. 
22 Ibid., 92. 
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He asserts: “It properly conveys the primacy of Palestinian affiliation and orientation without 
renouncing Israeli connections.”23   
One crucial aspect that is often misaddressed when studying the way Palestinians in 
Israel can be included is the integration of the Palestinian Arab minority in Israel. The Arabs 
cannot be likened to any other minority that wants to fit into their host country, as they are the 
indigenous people of their homeland. Sammy Smooha gives the example of Shlomo Avineri, an 
Israeli political scientist who belongs to the group of intellectuals known as “post 
Zionists”.24Smoohas’ use of Avineri’s statement, presented below, epitomises the failure to 
recognise the fact that the Palestinians are indigenous to the land which further problematizes the 
application of the Melting Pot in Israel: 
  [Shlomo Avineri] nevertheless sees no difficulty in Israel continuing to be a Jewish state 
and maintaining the flag, anthem, and Law of Return as they are. Avineri's basic 
assumption is that Israel is a national state, no different from other Western liberal 
democracies. He explains that the Israeli anthem Hatikvah [The Hope] is no different 
from the British anthem God Save the Queen or the French Marseilles. All of these 
national anthems contain motifs that may be unacceptable to a portion of the population. 
The same holds true with regard to the Law of Return, which contains an element of 
discrimination, because "all immigration laws are discriminatory." The Law of Return is 
no different from the immigration laws of Great Britain, Switzerland, Germany, Greece, 
and Armenia, which likewise grant a right of return based on ethnic origin.25 
Shlomo Avineri claims that the state symbols of a nation state will never satisfy the 
citizens as a whole. His view contends that the Palestinian Arab minority in Israel is no different 
from the minorities in Britain, France, Denmark and Switzerland. Therefore, his argument is 
flawed because he didn’t address the fact that the Palestinian citizens of Israel are the indigenous 
people, and they are not “new arrivals” that are waiting to be resettled. When talking about or 
                                               
23 The most popular identity selected by Arabs in the survey conducted by Smooha in 2003 was 
“Palestinian Arab in Israel.” Smooha, Index of Arab-Jewish Relations in Israel 2004. 
24 Smooha, Sammy. "Ethnic Democracy: Israel as an Archetype." Israel Studies 2.2 (1997): 210. 
25Ibid., 211. 
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studying the way the Palestinians in Israel can fit into the Melting Pot in Israel, “integration,” 
which is in fact a two way process, to be elucidated below,  is often confused with 
“assimilation,” which is a one way process.  
 Assimilation is a process of absorbing minority communities into the ways and views of 
the majority within a multicultural society. This absorption takes place in a unilinear direction as 
the minority groups are required to learn the customs and traditions of the majority giving up 
their own heritage or modifying their cultural practices to become acceptable to the dominant 
community.26  This model does not work in Israel. This is because the Palestinian Arabs were the 
indigenous people of the place before the state of Israel was established. Consequently, they are 
entitled to integration and not assimilation. Integration is a dialogic process; this dialogue 
requires both concerned groups to not only share models of change but also to, first, 
acknowledge that “change on the part of both communities”27 is essential to this conception of 
integration. This process manifests with modifications in both the Palestinian and the Jewish 
Israeli cultures. Both the majority and the minority have to exert a concerted effort to contain one 
another.  
The process of ‘integration’ of the Palestinian Arab minority in Israel, began after the end 
of the Military Rule of 1966. Israel mandated the Arab citizens to assimilate rather than integrate 
because the state wanted them to renounce their Palestinian identity and replace it with a pure 
Israeli one - typifying the unilateral nature of their process which bolsters the detrimental notion 
of the Melting Pot.  
                                               
26 Alba, Richard, and Victor Nee. “Assimilation.” An Introduction to Immigrant Incorporation Studies: 
European Perspectives, edited by Marco Martiniello and Jan Rath, Amsterdam University Press, 2014, 
pp. 54. 
27Securing the Future: U.S. Immigrant Integration Policy: A Reader. Edited by Michael Fix, Washington, 
DC. Migration Policy Institute, 2007, 192. 
15 
 
  Across a variety of the definitions posited on integration, the cohort integrating are 
attempting to integrate into a new country that is not their own:  Integration of immigrant 
minorities28. By adopting and retooling this definition, which involves the removal of the 
immigrant component from it and substituting it with the indigenous Arab minority in Israel, this 
paper operates on the dialogic conception of integration. This redefinition is what the entire 
conflict hinges upon because it prevents the “fifth column” from becoming part of the structure 
as opposed to being exclusively perceived as the problem. The history of the conflict itself, 
accompanied by the regime’s projects that hindered the process of dialogic integration, illustrates 
the need to pay a retrospective glance in order to ensure that, as we move forward, we recognize 
the monologic narratives of Israel’s past.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
28Ibid.  
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Background of the Conflict 
To sufficiently understand the Arab situation in Israel, one must examine the role Arabs 
have played in Israel since its establishment. This is illustrated by partitioning the 69 years of 
existence of the Israeli state into five periods. These periods are: Post 1948 until the end of the 
military rule in 1966; the 1967 Six Day War, following the process of Palestinization until the 
1970s; 1976 Land Day and the First Lebanon War in 1982; the 1993 Oslo Accords followed by 
the “honeymoon period”; the October 2000 events and the Second Intifada. 
Military Rule 1948-1966 
From 1948 to 1967, an Israeli Arab identity prevailed and very few Arabs in Israel 
publicly identified themselves as Palestinians.29 As political scientist Alan Dowty referred to it 
“as a period of political quietism”.30 This weakness and fear of Palestinian identity among Arabs 
in Israel emerged as a result of both, the collective disaster that had just occurred to the 
Palestinian nation as a whole in the war of 1947-1949 and the repressive measures that the state 
authorities exercised vis a vis Arab citizens during the 1950s and 1960s. It is difficult to 
understand the Israeli regime today and its attitude towards the Arab minority, without 
understanding the rotations of the regime in the past, especially during its establishment in 1948, 
and the start of the rule of the military government over the Arab population that remained in the 
country. It is indubitable that this administrative period, which lasted 18 years, was a formative 
phase with regard to the relations between the state and its indigenous national minority who 
                                               
29Kimmerling, Baruch, and Joel S. Migdal. The Palestinian People: A History. Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University, 2003. 186.  
30  Alan Dowty. “The Jewish State a Century Later.” Berkeley: University of California Press, (1998): 
194. 
 
17 
 
were, under military rule; there was essentially no facet of life for the Arab population in which 
the state did not interfere in, whether it was private or public. This massive intrusion of the state 
into the public and private spheres of the Arabs lives’ included the restriction of their movement, 
their political organization, land prosecution, surveillance over the education system, commerce 
and the registration of birth and death certificates. The extent of this oppression underscores the 
course of blatant interference in the political activity of the Arab population at both the 
municipal and national level.  
This encroachment by the militaristic bureaucracy was deleterious to not only the right to 
life and dignity of the Arab minority in Israel but also their ability to advocate against this 
heinous mistreatment. During this period, the Arabs remained fearful and uncertain about their 
future in Israel as they were afraid by ejection from the state in the case of voicing their 
opposition; the dominant narrative was Israeli and the political space was strictly monologic.31 
Consequently, there was an absence of prominent voices in the Arab community calling for 
freedom or equality, with the exception of Al-Ard and Maki. Al-Ard (the land in Arabic) was a 
small-scale nationalist movement established in 1958. It promoted Pan-Arabism and advocated 
for a Palestinian identity.32 The Supreme Court disqualified the party from running in the 
Knesset elections because the party rejected the Jewish nature of the state and identified with 
Arab enemy states.33 Maki, the Arab-Jewish Communist Party, on the other hand, was able to 
stay within the boundaries of the permissible, that is the accepted ‘standards’ of political 
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discourse in Israel, while expressing Arab nationalism and anti-Zionist sentiment.34 Although the 
present of Maki was significant, it remained at the periphery of Israel’s political discourse during 
the 1950s and the 1960s.  
The majority of the Arabs were notable in advocating for their desire to be recognized as 
a national minority. People were afraid to talk about their Palestinian identity even in the most 
private spheres. Parents were afraid to politicize their children, so they won’t go to school and 
give the wrong answer or sing the wrong song on Independence day; the regime, by making the 
Arabs cognizant of the threat of force, coerced Arab Palestinian families to fulfill the functions 
of the state – indoctrinate the narratives of the state into the next generation of Arab Palestinians 
so as to assimilate into the “Melting Pot” as opposed to preserving their distinct identity within 
society. Anton Shammas describes, in one scene in “Arabesques,” a narrative that the writer 
sources from his own experiences, the manner in which his school used to decorate its hallways 
with the Star of David to make a good impression on the government inspector (Arabesques 
237). This was the case in every Arab school shortly after the establishment of the state of Israel. 
Arab students were forced to celebrate the Day of Independence and passionately sing songs 
while holding the Israeli flag, without understanding the context of their actions. The regime 
mandated such actions so as to make the Arabs internalize the dominant narrative and be the site 
of political spectacles embodying the source of their unremitting distress and pain.  
In addition, during this Period, the Arab sector was segregated and could not participate 
in the Israeli discourse due to lack of contact with Israeli Jews and the restrictions posed by the 
military government. It was a period of assimilation, where it was a one-way adjustment for the 
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Arabs to learn how to live in Israel, by studying the Hebrew language and history; it was an 
assimilation of a language emblematic of their political oppression and the narratives maintained 
by the oppressors.  
Six Day War 1967-1970s 
Palestinian nationalism gained strength among Arabs in Israel following the 1967 War 
and Israel’s conquest of East Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. This national 
consciousness was, in time, termed Palestinization.35 With this wave of Palestinization, Arabs in 
Israel rejected the Arab Israeli identity that the state was attempting to cultivate, by promoting an 
agenda to create a de-nationalized Arab identity through the control of the education system.36 
There are several reasons for this political and national awakening. Arabs in Israel experienced 
socio-economic development in the post-1967 years, which allowed them to improve their living 
conditions and receive higher levels of education, that helped their movement from the 
predominantly rural areas to the urban landscapes; the cities served as the epicenter of both 
socio-political discourse but also the educational institutions where academics had the 
opportunity to, although not explicitly, explore the oppressive regime’s practices.37 The military 
government that started with the establishment of the state in 1948, eventually ended in 1966. 
The absence of this government gave more freedom to the Arabs in terms of their right of 
movement, freedom of expression and political organization. The votes of the Arabs became 
more important in the Knesset elections after the political hegemony of the Mapai party that 
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lasted 30 years.38 The Labor party could not take the Arabs’ votes for granted following this 
political event. However, the fundamental change that affected the Palestinians in Israel during 
that period was the 1967 Six Day War and its subsequent impact on the Middle East. This war 
led to the conquest of the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and East Jerusalem, which enabled Arabs in 
Israel to renew their social, cultural, economic and political contact with their fellow Palestinians 
in the occupied territories.  
This physical closeness with the Palestinians increased their Palestinian-national 
consciousness, and empowered them to express their Palestinian identity to a greater extent in 
public. Palestinians in Israel transformed from being passive citizens to a politically active 
community. They started demanding their rights that would result in being treated equally as 
well as a national minority with collective rights. The end of the military rule also allowed them 
to experience greater geographic and political mobilization within Israel; Arab-Jewish relations, 
at this time, were formed and developed due to the lifting of the restrictions of movements for 
Arabs in Israel.  
Land Day 1976 - First Lebanon War 1980s 
On March 30th, 1976 was the first time the Arabs organized collectively and called for a 
national strike to protest the discriminatory acts of the Israeli government in confiscating land in 
order to promote the “Judaizing” of the Galilee program. The Arabs, in this socio-historical 
moment, shed their fears of the brutal political repercussions for political resistance and thus, this 
act of solidarity illuminated the extent of the political oppression. In the massive demonstrations 
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that commenced that day, the Israeli police forces killed six Arab protestors, injured dozens and 
arrested around 260. This event was called Yaum al-Ard or Land Day. It became an annual day 
of Palestinian protest in Israel contributing to a competing Arab Palestinian narrative. The 
emergence of a narrative of resistance posed an immediate threat to the domination of the Israeli 
narrative highlighting the potential for the creation of a dialogic political space.   
Land Day inaugurated a period of Palestinian protest that continued throughout the 
1980s, and especially after the first Lebanon War in 1982.39 The majority of these protests were 
organized in solidarity with the fellow Palestinians in the occupied territories or the Palestinians 
in the diaspora. In 1982, a general strike was called to protest the massacre of Palestinians in 
refugee camps in West Beirut; The Sabra; and the Shatila massacre. There were approximately 
2000 Palestinian refugees killed during this devastating massacre.40 The Sabra and Shatila 
massacres were a turning point in Israeli politics and history for many Jewish Israelis. It was an 
eye opening event that made a considerable proportion of the Israeli Jews shift their political 
opinion and move towards the left on the classical conception of the political spectrum.41 It was a 
time epitomized by questioning the status quo. Several liberal intellectuals in Israel, took 
advantage of this time to publish their works and make people question the nature of and 
situation of Israeli politics. Anton Shammas wrote his fictional autobiography, “Arabesques” 
during that time. Arabesques got unprecedented reactions and political weight because, at the 
time, it was inconceivable to separate the personal from the political. 
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The Oslo Accords 1993-2000s 
The Oslo agreement was a practical expression and confirmation of the position that most 
Israelis held: two states for two peoples. During the Oslo Accords, there was political air 
surrounding the accords referred to as the “honeymoon feeling” of the Arab sector in 
Israel.  However, this so called honeymoon phase did not last for very long. This is because, as 
Azmi Bishara, an Arab Israeli politician and founder of Al-Tajammu’ party declared: “We are 
part of the problem, but we are not part of the solution".42 This is because essentially, throughout 
the whole process of the Oslo Accords and its committees, there was no mention of the situation 
of the Palestinian Arab minority that is ruled and discriminated against in a Jewish state, which is 
the byproduct of the 1948 war. Despite the limitations and omissions of the agreement, the Arabs 
thought that they would be granted several benefits once ‘peace’ was achieved. First, they 
thought that discrimination against them wouldn’t be simply justified by virtue of the security 
threat they, as Arabs, seemed to pose. Second, they hoped that after peace is achieved, Israel 
would cut from its allocations to the military and settlements, and channel them to domestic 
need.43 These hopes did not last for too long because it became clear that the Palestinian 
Authority (PA) didn’t include the Palestinian Israelis in the negotiations and focused on its 
ultimate goal of establishing a Palestinian state.44 Thus, instead of focusing on ending Israel's 
occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Arabs in Israel gradually started shifting their 
political activity and adopting a new agenda that focused on improving the status of the 
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Palestinians within Israel in order to reach complete equality with the Jewish majority, and even 
dismantle the Jewish nature of the state.45 This was called by Elie Rekhess, a scholar of political 
history of the Arabs in Israel: “the localization of the national struggle”.46 
 Palestinians in Israel shifted from exclusively focusing on issues such as the unequal 
resource distribution between Arabs and Jews, to directing their attention to the reason for why 
this treatment exists, which is the exclusive Jewish nature of the state that is the origin of their 
“dispossession, deprivation, and marginalization.”47 Nadim Rouhana, a Palestinian Israeli 
scholar, claims that the Jewish ethnic aspect of the state of Israel, allows it to design 
discriminatory laws and regulations against the Arabs to benefit the Jews alone. In addition, this 
manifests as a contradiction of the defining terms of Israel’s own self-image, which labels itself 
democratic. The self-representation of democracy, by Israel, is blinded by the smuggling of 
tyrannical rule under the guise of democracy.48 The main role the Palestinian political leaders 
played during the 1990s and 2000s was to challenge Israel’s self-identity as both democratic and 
Jewish publicly. The majority of Arabs in Israel called for Israel to be a “state for all its 
citizens”.49 That became the slogan that Arabs carried then, and are still carrying today. There 
was a desire by the new Palestinian generation in Israel to become active citizens and belong to 
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the state, which is termed as positive equality.50  
Many Israeli figures perceived this attitude from the Arab political leaders and public as a 
threat and in a way depriving them (the Jews) from the right of self-definition. Therefore, they 
called Palestinians to leave Israel and reside in the future Palestinian state that will rise next to 
Israel, if they are dissatisfied with Israel’s Jewish nature. We can see that in the famous 
encounter and continuous correspondence between Anton Shammas and A.B Yehoshua, that the 
paper is going to grapple with in the proceeding chapter, that another change that was apparent 
after the Oslo Accords was the gap between the expectation of the Arabs and the expectations of 
the Jews. After the ‘peace,’  Jews wanted to enhance and strengthen the Jewish values of the 
state, and the Arabs remained the “pillars of obstruction”.51 The Arabs in Israel understood that 
and realized that the legitimacy of the Oslo process, including the consequences of this 
‘negotiation,’ would only exacerbate the differences between Arabs and Jews; the irony is that 
every diplomatic ‘resolution’ pushes the conflicting parties further apart and, in turn, further 
from achieving a sustained ‘peace’.  
Second Intifada - October 2000 Events 
During the late 1990s, it became more apparent that the Arabs in Israel underwent crises 
in their relationship with the Jewish majority and the state power. If it wasn’t apparent in the 
1980s and 1990s, it was impossible to avoid it during the events of October 2000, which is also 
known as the Second Intifada. The Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel went out to the streets to 
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demonstrate. The people who were in the streets won a lot of public support. The majority of 
Arab homes in Israel supported the Intifada or at least sympathized with the people in the streets.  
The prominent reason as to why the demonstrations in October 2000 erupted was the provocative 
act of the MK Ariel Sharon, the opposition leader at the time, to visit the Temple Mount (al-
Haram al-Sharif) on September 28 with hundreds of troops, interrupting the prayers. The Temple 
Mount is the holiest Islamic site in Palestine, and third in the world, after Mecca and Medina. 
The Arab sector reacted by protesting and these protests and demonstrations also included 
expressions of violence that took place on the next day in the Al-Aqsa Mosque during the Friday 
prayers (September 29). Israeli forces opened fire on a crowd of unarmed demonstrators at Al-
Aqsa compound, killing seven and injuring more than a 100. On September 30th, there was a 
collision of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip with the IDF, which is also where 
many were killed and wounded. However, the underlying reasons for the Intifada were the policy 
of the Israeli state towards the Palestinian Arabs, both in the past and present. These reasons also 
related to the political events earlier in the 1990s and the failure of the Oslo Accords.  
Palestinians in Israel went through both, Israelization and Palestinization. They went 
through Israelization post 1948. As a result, they became bilingual and bicultural without 
integrating into the Jewish society. They have aspirations that they await to be fulfilled in Israel, 
and they see their future in Israel. They do not see this as a contradiction to their Palestinian 
identity  i.e., solidarity with the Palestinian people, support for the PLO, advocacy of a two-state 
solution, acquisition of Palestinian identity, and the demand to introduce Palestinian elements 
into the Arab education system52. Their Israeliness is constituted by their Israeli citizenship and 
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respect to the state.53 This complex identity for Arabs in Israel, led to the creation of different 
variations of Arab citizens. Especially with the beginning of the 21st century, and the process of 
globalization that paved the way for Israeli Arabs to utilize the different aspects of the 
burgeoning field of the digital and communications space. Two of the artists, within the triptych 
in this paper, were exposed to media, in the form of television shows specifically, that utilized 
the artistic medium as a form of political engagement.54 In the proceeding chapters, the paper is 
going to introduce Sayed Kashua and Lucy Aharish, whose work got its acclaim during this 
period characterized by the politicization of non-print media. Even though Kashua and Aharish 
were both Muslim Arabs who received their primary education in the Jewish school system, their 
stances on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and on the Israeli political situation were very different. 
Aharish speaks like an Israeli centrist,55 while Kashua is an uprooted writer torn between 
tradition and identity.56  
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Gaps and Disparities 
Arabs in Israel are largely excluded from the public life in the country.57 They have not 
integrated into the state’s sphere either economically nor socially, and they are treated with 
suspicion by the state and by the Israeli Jewish society. There are many fields in which the 
disparities and gaps between the Arab and Jewish citizens are made apparent. “The extreme 
socio-economic inequality between Jews and Arabs is one of the biggest, if not the the biggest, 
problems that affect majority-minority relations in Israel.”58  
In a study led by Kretzmer, he shows that despite the legal principle of equality that Israel 
possesses, there is very clear discrimination against the Arab citizens of Israel.  
A substantial digression from the principle of equality is created by the special 
legal status accorded to the Jewish Agency and the Jewish National Fund. These 
powerful Jewish institutes, which fulfill quasi-governmental functions-such as planning 
and funding of new rural localities, support for cultural enterprises, provision of 
assistance to the elderly and other disadvantaged groups, and development and leasing of 
lands-are obliged by their own constitutions to serve Jews only. At the same time, Arab 
voluntary associations are hampered from getting contributions and raising funds because 
of the suspicion that they would receive money from hostile or terrorist organizations.59 
Poverty 
According to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 
around 50% of the Arab population earns less than half of the median income in Israel.60 Almost 
half of the Arab population in Israel which composes 22% percent of the Israeli population, live 
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in poverty despite the economic boom that Israel has been experiencing over the past two 
decades. Arabs haven’t been able to enjoy the benefits of the economic growth. There are many 
reasons and factors to this poverty in the Arab sector. Below is articulated a number of the 
explanations.  
Unemployment Rates and Average Incomes 
The unemployment rates are one of the main reasons for poverty in the Arab sector. In a 
research conducted in 2003, out of forty seven towns in Israel with higher than average 
unemployment rates, forty six were Arab towns.61 The average income for Arabs in 2007 was 
7700$ and 1900$ for Israeli Jews. On average Arab men earn 60% of the national average wage, 
and Arab women earn 70% of the national average wage.62 Ilan Peleg said that this wide income 
gap between Arab and Jew workers is a defining feature of Israel’s economy. Arabs are more 
likely to have lower wage jobs in Israel. Although over the years, Arabs have gone from being 
farmers and unskilled laborers, into being industrial workers and professionals (teachers, 
lawyers, doctors, and pharmacists),63 they will mostly occupy the lower bars of the occupational 
ladder. In 2003 for example, a quarter of all employed Arabs worked in construction.64 Most of 
the Arabs work in Jewish owned businesses, so they are dependent on the economy of the Jews 
and don’t have an independent economy. A miniscule proportion of the Arab population occupy 
the high occupational categories. 4 percent of the workers in the Israeli high-tech sector were 
Arabs; they are very much under-represented; and they don’t benefit from the booming industry 
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their field is experiencing. 
Arabs cannot compete equally in the job market in Israel because of their ‘untrustworthy’ 
status, exclusion from powerful Jewish social networks, and interpersonal and institutional 
discrimination.65 Claims of security considerations and lack of social networks, and 
discrimination have affected the employment of Arabs as a whole, and university graduates in 
particular.66 A study conducted in 2009, showed that one out of two Arab university graduates 
was unemployed, and several are underemployed.67 As Irit Tamir, the chairwoman of an Israeli 
employers’ coalition that promotes equality for Arab university graduates put it: “We are 
cultivating another talented, educated, frustrated and bitter generation.”68 
All of this promotes the significant socio economic gap between Arabs and Jews in 
Israel. Furthermore, it shows that there is no single cause that this gap can be attributed to. 
Another factor that plays into the socio economic gaps between the Arab minority and they 
Jewish majority in Israel is the notably large Arab families and low participation of Arab women 
in the labor force. Thus, the state cannot be completely blamed for the inequality between Jews 
and Arabs, but it definitely bears a significant responsibility because of its discriminatory 
policies that have actually been neglected by many Israeli governments such as the underfunding 
and underdevelopment of Arab industry and agriculture as compared to the Jewish funding 
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allocated for agriculture.69 
Land Confiscation  
The issue of land in Israel is one of the oldest issues of discrimination against Arabs and 
it is apparent to the naked eye, with no need of extensive investigation to announce the Arab 
disparities in relation to land. The state’s Jewish identity demonstrates clear Jewish favoritism in 
access to land, land planning, rural and urban development, and provision of housing. As Ilan 
Peleg says: “the most egregious examples of official discrimination against Arabs can be found 
in these areas.”70 The issue of land was at the heart of the conflict since its incipience, since the 
success of the Zionist mission depended on Jewish territorial control and expansion.71 Israel’s 
appropriation of Arab land and its bureaucratic and legal restrictions on Arab access and use of 
said land have been one of the principal reasons of the Arab anger and protests. Israel undertook 
a program of “Judaizing” the country through a series of laws and regulations.72 Part of these 
regulations was the transferring of land ownership from the hands of the Arabs to the Jews. 
Consequently, the Jewish community, from controlling only 13.5 percent of the land in 1949, 
owned and controlled 93 percent by the 1960s.73 Between 50 and 60 percent of the Arab held 
land was expropriated by the state, and they lost their collective territorial assets and interests 
because all the land that was transferred to the state, supposedly for public purposes, being 
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available for Jewish use only.74 
Even though the Arab population has increased since the establishment of the Jewish 
state, the percentage of land available to them has alarmingly shrunk. Arabs own only 3.5 
percent of the land in Israel, and live on less than 2.5 percent, even though they compose 22.3 
percent of the Israeli population.75 The majority of the Galilee region inhabitants are Arabs, 
about 70 percent. The Arab municipalities have jurisdiction over only 16.1 percent of the land. 
The similar case at the Israeli Negev, where 25 percent of its inhabitants are Arabs, illustrates 
that Arab run municipalities have jurisdiction over merely 1.9 percent of the land.76 Arabs have 
been prevented from establishing new settlements in Israel. Since the establishment of the Israeli 
state in 1948, there were 700 hundred Jewish settlements established within Israel’s pre 1967 
borders, and no Arab settlements. With an exception of the few settlements in the Negev that was 
aimed at urbanizing and geographically concentrating the Bedouins in the Negev and the 
Northern Galilee, half of the Bedouin population reside in the new townships established by the 
state.77 The rest, about 80,000 people live in 36 “unrecognized” villages. They live in extreme 
poverty and lack basic necessities, such as water, sewage and electricity. Moreover, they live in 
the constant threat of having to evacuate their villages at anytime, and having their homes 
demolished because the state deems them illegal. 
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Housing Development 
The lack of land resources leads to the problem of housing and housing development 
amongst the Arab sector. Arab towns and cities are very densely populated due to the severe 
shortage of housing. Between 1975 and 2000, public housing units built for the Arab population 
were just 0.3 percent of the total (fewer than 1,000 units out of a total of 337,000.78 The 
government poses many restrictions on residential construction. It is very difficult for Arabs to 
obtain building permits, thus, a lot of the times they build their housing without the possession of 
the legal papers. The government often demolishes these houses akin to the way it happened in 
Qalansawe, an Arab city in the Central district of Israel. The government tore down 13 houses in 
January of 2017, which lead to massive Arab demonstrations all over Israel. On the one hand, the 
government punishes the Arabs who build without the legal permits and on the other hand, it 
doesn’t provide them with any alternative.  
There are many barriers for Arabs to live in Jewish communities, both formal and 
informal. Arabs are excluded from any land that is allocated by the Jewish National Fund (JFN) 
and the Jewish Agency, that are run exclusively by Jews are solely geared toward serving Jews. 
Municipality Allocation  
Municipalities in Israel are not funded equally. Arab municipalities are significantly 
underfunded when compared to Jewish municipalities. They receive very insufficient monetary 
support to develop their physical infrastructure required for utilities.79 Arab towns in Israel 
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receive less money than the settlements in the occupied territories. The government allocates 
1241 NIS (explain NIS per capita) per capita in West Bank Settlements, compared to only 738 
NIS in Arab towns.80  
Schools 
The lack of municipal funding in Arab towns, affects the public schooling system and its 
allocation directly. Arab schools are severely ill-equipped and insufficiently furnished as 
compared to Jewish schools, and often, there is lack of personnel that leads to creating larger 
class size.81 This affects and exacerbates the public spending on education per child in Arab 
towns, which is about one third of that spent predominantly in Jewish municipalities. This 
explicit disequilibrium in the allocation of funds prevents Arab schools from providing their 
students with extracurricular activities, health services and counseling.82 The provision of a 
diluted form of education preserves the Arab dependence upon the Jewish state.  
Law of Return 
The Law of Return is an Israeli legislation that was passed on July of 1950, two years 
after the establishment of the state. The law states that Jews, regardless of their country of origin 
and whether or not they can show links to Israel-Palestine have the right to live in Israel and gain 
Israeli citizenship: “Every Jew has the right to come to this country as an oleh”.83 The Arab 
Palestinians citizens who lived in Historic Palestine for generations and fled or were driven out 
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of their villages during the 1948 War and had to seek refuge in other countries due to their Nakba 
(Tragedy) are abstained from this right, even though they have documented ancestral homes in 
the country. Moreover, the Palestinians who fled their villages and found refuge in other Arab 
towns or villages in Israel are not allowed to go back to their villages of origins. These internally 
displaced persons (IDPs).84 This law is seen as offensive and carries clear attempts of 
institutionalized ethnic discrimination. 
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The Triptych 
Anton Shammas - Arabesques  
Anton Shammas’ writings raise concerns about the essence of the Hebrew language and 
its position in terms of theology. It also raises questions about the core of the language and the 
role it plays in Jewish nationalism the mobilization of the Hebrew language before the 
establishment of the state of Israel, was one of the most important tools for the Jews to create 
their “imagined community” to form their collective identity. As literary scholar Michael 
Gluzman articulates: “The Hebrew writer often perceived himself as the “watchman unto the 
house of Israel”.85 Gluzman echoed H.N Bialik when he wrote in his book  Dvarim Shebe’alpe: 
And indeed, only through Hebrew literature did we arrive at revival and Zionism. 
Without it, we wouldn’t have arrived at this point. All of [Hebrew] literature of the last 
hundred and fifty years has been a preparation for our revival. He who doesn’t 
understand this, his feet did not stand on the Mount Sinai of Hebrew literature. Even the 
writers of the Haskalah, who are viewed as anti-nationalists, prepared us and brought us 
to the present. This cannot be denied: that from Smolenskin on, it was Hebrew literature 
alone that refined the nation and brought us to revival because she [Hebrew literature] 
was the guide.86 
Hannan Hever, a scholar of Modern Hebrew literature argues in her essay Ivrit be-eto 
Shel Aravi: “The Hebrew writing of an Arab writer is an unusual phenomenon in the Israeli 
cultural landscape, and undoubtedly involves a blurring of the traditional boundaries of the 
national culture.”87 Many agree with Hever and see that the choice that Shammas made to write 
in Hebrew (as a non-Jew), involves ‘blurring’ of the traditional boundaries of the national 
culture. It is seen as a threat that Shammas sought to de-Judaize the Hebrew language and turn it 
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into a language shared by all Israelis, Jews and Arabs alike.88 Shammas calls for liberating 
Hebrew from its dogmatic theological signification and subsequently deny its exclusivity to 
Judaism.89 Shammas’ response to Hever and other similar voices was as such:  
What I’m trying to do mulishly, it seems-is to un-Jew the Hebrew language, to 
make it more Israeli and less Jewish, thus bringing it back to its Semitic origins, to its 
place. This is a parallel to what I think the state should be. As English is the language of 
those who speak it, so is Hebrew; and so the state should be the state of those who live in 
it, not of those who play with its destiny with a remote control in hand.90 
Shammas’ most acclaimed work is the Hebrew novel, Arabesques (1986). Arabesques 
explore issues such as inner exile, cultural and linguistic displacement. It is the history of the 
narrator’s family. He identifies himself in the novel as Anton Shammas. In the first part of the 
novel, “The Tale,” he lays out the story of his family’s history. It extends from the days of the 
Ottoman and British rule of Palestine when his family emigrated from Syria during the first half 
of the 19th century. They settled in Fassuta, a village in the northern district of Palestine in the 
Galilee. He illustrates his family’s history throughout the Arab Uprising of 1936-1939; the 
establishment of the state of Israel in 1948; the 1967 Six Days War; the occupation of the Gaza 
Strip; and the West Bank. Shammas argues that the novel’s Hebrew should be perceived as a tool 
to challenge the narrative of Israel, in historian Baruch Kimmerling words “as a homogenous 
ethno-national entity and identity,” and try to replace it with “a new local national identity, or 
nationality, common to Jews and Arabs of the country, and based solely on state citizenship and 
territory”. 91 Shammas employs the language to be his novel’s rhetoric thereby highlighting the 
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conflation of the literary realm with the employment of a language that is itself inherently 
politicized given the Palestinian-Israeli socio-historical context. When interpreting any written 
text, there is always a gap created between the words and the meaning that the writer intends 
through its use. This gap can be translated in a form of symbols that hold specific definitions and 
have certain implications beyond the text. In Shammas’ case, the Hebrew language signifies the 
separation between himself and the state of Israel, and it communicates the cultural and political 
dialectics that illustrates this distance. While abandoning Arabic, Shammas’ mother tongue, he 
distances himself from the Palestinian tradition he depicts authentically in his book. However, 
his choice of Hebrew fictionalizes the autobiography. It presents a threat to the Jewish hegemony 
over Hebrew literature; thus, he is estranged by the literary tradition he himself adopted. 
The intentionality of Arabesques is to cultivate a process of questioning the status quo 
within the reader. It challenges the reader’s perspective on the Palestinian problem and makes 
him question the self-identity of the Palestinian and its historicity.  The exposure of these new 
perspectives, create a demand for the reevaluation of the ideological norms that shaped the 
Israeli attitude towards the Palestinian problem. It prompts the audience with a provocative 
rereading of the reality they live in. Furthermore, the text presents a critical rereading of the 
writer’s own norms, a reexamining of his position as an Israeli artist with a Palestinian identity 
and lineage.   
As shown in the previous chapters, the Jewish-Hebrew culture in Israel is the superior 
one, while the Palestinian culture is inferior. Shammas’ decision to write in the ‘superior’ idiom 
to tell the story of the ‘inferior’ Palestinian, breaks the norms and exclusivity of Hebrew 
literature and Israeli culture as a whole. Shammas sets his story in the central arena of Israeli 
culture and thereby diminishes his peripheral, marginal status, and fashions an artistic space for 
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the Palestinian writer and Israeli readers. He appropriates Hebrew to tell his story, and with his 
story being non-Jewish, he deconstructs its theological and ideological premises. This is because, 
Hebrew literature is usually taken to be Jewish literature.92 
Historical precedents view the adoption of the colonizer’s language as a betrayal of the 
original language and by extension the nation and its culture. This is because, it is seen as a form 
of both ‘acceptance’ of and ‘submission’ to the colonizer.93 On the contrary, the objection to this 
position underlines the fact that the adoption of the colonizer’s language is necessary. This is 
because the linguistic mode communicates a conflicted desire of simultaneously asserting the 
merit of the colonized culture and self, and integrating into the new dominant culture. As of now, 
the common language allows a two-way correspondence. Arabesques recounts an 
autobiographical narrative that on the one hand, expresses Palestinian oral tradition and on the 
other hand, due to its stylistic features, claims a place in the Hebrew literary tradition. The 
deliberate choice to write in Hebrew, the language which defines the genre of literature 
predominantly read by Israelis, with the narrative of a Palestinian at its essence, strongly 
suggests an implied audience for Shammas’ narrative. This “Palestinian Arabic story written in 
Hebrew letters”94 is intended for Israeli readership to promote dialogue where the readers will 
not only respond to the formal aspects of the text but they would also respond to the 
intentionality of the work itself.  
Shammas is conscious of the obstruction and complication of the dialogic mode he is 
trying to promote. One of the novel’s characters, Yehoshua Bar-On, a Jewish Israeli writer who 
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was with  Anton at the writers’ workshop in Iowa City in the States, expressed his wish to Anton 
to write a novel about an Arab Israeli writer. Bar-On initially wanted Anton to be his protagonist 
claiming that it's his ultimate opportunity to be in close contact with such an educated and 
intellectual Arab. He describes “his” Arab as follows:  
He is not a rider on the back of a galloping horse, as in the stories of that 
“Hawaja,” and he is not a prisoner as in the story by the nephew. And he is not a 
lost boy in love. Indeed, he speaks and writes in proper Hebrew, but within the 
boundaries of the permissible. [...] There has to be an Arab this time, as some sort 
of solution to some sort of silence. An Arab who speaks the language of Grace, as 
Dante once called it. Hebrew as the language of Grace, as opposed to the 
language of confusion that swept over the world when the Tower of Babel 
collapsed. My Arab will build his tower of confusion on my plot. In the language 
of Grace. That’s his only possible redemption. (Arabesques 91- 92) 
 אוה ןיאו ,אוהה ה׳גאוחה רופיסב ומכ ,סוס לע רהוד אוה ןיא״ דובא רענ אוה ןיאו .ןייחאה רופיסב ומכ יובש
רתומה תולובגב לבא ,החצ תירבע בתוכו רבוד אוה םנמא .בהואמו״ 
 םינפל תירבעל ארקש יפכ ,דסחה תפשב רבדמש יברע .יהשלכ הקיתשל ןורתפכ ,םעפה יברע םכירכומ״
 םלועה לע השגרתהש לובלבה תפש תמועל דסחה תפשכ תירבעה .הלוגה  יניטנרולפה .לבב לדגמ טטומתהב
תירשפאה ותלואג יתעדל וז ,דסחה תפשב ולובלב לדגמ תא ישרגמ לע הנבי ילש יברעה״              
 תוקסברע(82-83) 
The difficulty and complexity of the dialogic enterprise is presented in this passage. Bar-
On has a fixed idea of his conception of the quintessential Arab, and the manner in which he 
envisions ‘his’ Arab comporting himself. This exposes the double standards of Israeli liberalism 
and democracy. On the one hand, Israel claims that it wants to include the Arabs in the state’s 
sphere. On the other hand, like Bar-On, the state has a set of restrictive rules that decide how 
Arabs can act within Israel. The Arabs can integrate only “within the boundaries of the 
permissible”. What Bar-On advocates for in the aforementioned passage accords with the 
definition of ‘assimilation’ explained in the previous chapter, and not with ‘integration’. This is 
because Bar-On is suggesting a one-way process, where he decides, and thus circumscribes, the 
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autonomy of the Arab so as to absorb him, At the same time, the Jewish Israeli  is not required to 
go through any process of change or transformation allowing for a preservation of the status quo 
because the Israeli belongs to the superior-dominant culture. This can be inferred by the fact that, 
in relation to Bar-On’s account, he omits any scope for change within the Jewish Israeli whilst 
advocating for his model of ‘his’ Arab. Bar-On is aware of the confusion of the Arab and he 
wishes to celebrate this confusion in the plot of his future creation, with the help of Anton who 
would serve as “his Arab.” 
Bar-On’s Arab is not the stereotypical Arab that is often represented in literature. He 
repeats what he thinks his Arab “is not”, three times in fact. This negation of that which the Arab 
“is not” has noteworthy implications on the style of his locutions. In Hebrew Folk tales, the triple 
repetition is a very important and often used element in a majority of the folk stories. It’s referred 
to as “the trinity rule” or in Hebrew “שולישה קוח"”. In this passage, Shammas brings up a very 
important tool of Hebrew writing and literature, and at the same time he uses this tool to criticize 
the Israeli culture and its unfair demanding nature aimed at the Arab citizens. Bar-On’s Arab is 
an educated intellectual who speaks and writes in perfect Hebrew; however, this occurs 
exclusively “within the boundaries of the permissible.” 
 Shammas expresses the anxiety in the loneliness of the Israeli Arab. The Arab Israeli 
artist is isolated from the Israeli socio-cultural scene:   
about the loneliness of the Palestinian Arab Israeli who, having come to Jerusalem from 
his village in the Galilee . . . learned that, like the coffin, the loneliness of the Arab has 
room enough for only one person. (Arabesques 93) 
Shammas expresses his struggle in this passage as an Arab Palestinian who lived in the periphery 
of Israel his whole life and experienced extreme loneliness when moving to Jerusalem which is 
41 
 
the center of the Palestinian Israeli conflict, and the place where the bitter reality of the Arab’s 
quotidian activities in Israel are most apparent.  
The critical response to these passages has noted that the character of Bar-On carries a 
close resemblance to A.B. Yehoshua.  A.B Yehoshua, a Jewish Israeli writer, is considered to be 
part of Israel’s “peace camp”.95   The “peace camp”, as it was always quaintly postured itself as, 
has never recovered from the assassination in 1995 of Yitzhak Rabin, the prime minister who 
appeared to be on the brink of finalizing the peace deal they had all been advocating for decades. 
Inside Israel, he is regarded as one a symbols of the unofficial liberal conscience of the nation96. 
We can see this resemblance in the way they both approach and address the silence of the Arab 
in Hebrew life and literature.  A.B. Yehoshua’s famous story, “Mul Haye’arot” (Facing the 
Forests) also raised the issue of the infeasibility of the Arabic voice in the Hebrew narrative. In 
his story he says: “It appears that this is an old, mute Arab. In the war his tongue was cut off. Us 
or them, does it matter? Who knows what were the last words stuck in his throat?”97 According 
to Yehoshua, the Arab was silent and he couldn’t figure out what he was thinking about and what 
he had in mind. It is particularly striking that the stark image presented involves a body part, the 
‘tongue,’ without which communication becomes increasingly difficult. 
 This bespeaks the physical and ideological oppression meted out to the Arab community. 
He then says: “Who knows what were the last words stuck in his throat?” which lays emphasis 
on the disparity between the Palestinian Arab and the Jewish Israeli. In saying this, Yehoshua 
implies that he knows that the Arab wasn’t born silent and mute, and that there were words stuck 
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in his throat before his tongue was cut off. However, he never learned to know what these words 
and experiences meant. The apathetic tone of the question “does it matter?” in response to the 
mutilation of the Arab’s ability to speak symbolises the general insouciance in relation to the 
oppressed Arab. Shammas is attempting to articulate, within his work, a response to the voices 
that deprive the Arab of a role in dialogue which in turn undermines the notion of a dialogue 
itself as a process involving two standpoints. Although Yeshoua wonders whether the voice 
‘matters,’ Smooha clearly demonstrates his position that it is not one voice that matters, rather it 
is the voices, in dialogue that matter which require a two-way exchange for polarization to move 
towards discussion.  
There were a number of correspondences between Shammas and Yehoshua, concerning 
the nature of the book. The peak of these correspondences was in 1989, when Yehoshua 
published his book Hakir ve Hahar (The Wall and the Mountain), wherein he wrote an essay in 
the book addressing Shammas directly and advising him to leave Israel and go live in the future 
Palestinian state. 
If you want to live in a state with a distinct Palestinian identity, with an original 
Palestinian culture, go, take your bags and move one hundred meter eastward to the 
Palestinian state that will rise next to Israel.  Your condition will be far better than that of 
most national minorities in the world who do not have such an option. But if you stay, 
and I greet you, Welcome, you’re a minority. And in time of peace, you will learn, there 
are certain pleasures to being a minority. That’s the ABC of any compromise. Otherwise, 
what will happen? A Palestinian state will rise and then Israeli Arabs will demand a 
multinational or multi-religious state like the United States, even within Israel’s 
boundaries. So why would we call it Israel? Let us ask the computer to give us a name 
and a flag, that would be more appropriate. But why do Anton Shammas and his friend, 
think such things? Because, like the PLO, they still view the Jews as a religious group 
rather than as nation. Therefore, we have no right to self-definition. If Anton Shammas, 
whose knowledge could qualify him as a professor of Hebrew literature at the Hebrew 
University, still does not grasp this simple truth, then one can really fall into despair.98 
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In saying that, Yehoshua defines the state of Israel as being first Jewish before being 
democratic. So majority and minority are not simply numerical definitions of Israel’s compound, 
keeping in mind the ideological and socio-historical implications of the image of the “Melting 
Pot.” Even in the event that the Arabs, at a point in time, surpassed the number of Jews in Israel, 
Israel would still be a Jewish state, and the Jews would still be entitled to assume the position of 
the dominant power in the state. Yehoshua mocks the idea that Israel should change its symbols 
so it's more appropriate for both communities. He refuses to include Israel’s natural other in the 
Israeli and Hebrew discourse. He sees the Arabs as “rude guests”. It is analogous to the notion 
that Israel is extending its generosity by ‘hosting’ the Arab Palestinians like guests being 
welcomed to a house wherein the guests complain about the hospitality. Yehoshua suggests that 
Shammas and his peers who are not satisfied with Israel’s “hospitality” and nature, should take 
their bags and move to the Palestinian state that will rise next to the state of Israel. Yehoshua 
rejects the model of the United States as a multinational and multi religious state. He thinks that 
Israel would lose its purpose if it followed that model. He accuses Shammas of not seeing the 
Jewish people as a nation and of undermining their right as a people of self-definition, even 
though Shammas never made such claims. He asks him to move a hundred meters eastward if he 
wants to live in a state with a distinct Palestinian identity. Shammas never asked for a separate 
and segregated Palestinian sphere in Israel. What he asked for was recognition of the Palestinian 
being in Israel and their right to be a national minority, and for the inclusion of the Palestinian 
narrative in the Israeli one. That being said, Yehoshua is still considered to be one of the most 
liberal writers in Israel.99   
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Shammas is renowned for his artistry in Hebrew, he is seen in Israel as the pure artist, 
who expresses his thoughts and demands through complex and atonal images. He rejects 
interviews, and instead only lets his art to speak on his behalf. While Shammas demands 
integration and recognition through the intellectual Israeli Jewish reader, Sayed Kashua, another 
1948 Palestinian writer who writes in Hebrew only, reaches a complete different audience. 
Kashua’s style is radically different from Shammas’, he writes colloquially and does not seek 
elegancy in his writings. Kashua writes about events the way the naked eye depicts them. By 
doing that he manages to reach an impressively varied and wide audience that sways beyond the 
intellectual elite.  
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Arab Labor - Sayed Kashua 
Sayed Kashua is a Palestinian Israeli Arab writer. He was born in Tira, an Arab village in 
the Israeli Triangle, to Muslim parents. At the age of 14 he left his town and went to Jerusalem to 
attend a boarding school for gifted students, “The Israel Arts and Science Academy”. The school 
is predominantly Jewish, considering it was very rare for Arabs to attend the school at that time. 
Directly after high school he enrolled at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem to study Sociology 
and Philosophy. Following his graduation from the Hebrew University, he secured a job at Kol 
Ha’ir Newspaper. First, he wrote magazine articles then he became a TV critic and had his own 
satirical column. Kashua is part of a new generation within the group of Arab authors who write 
in Hebrew. His voice is unusual within this group because he writes exclusively in Hebrew as a 
result of being educated within the Jewish school system. For Kashua, Hebrew is his form of 
expression as he claims: “To write in Arabic the way I speak it, which is the Palestinian-Israeli 
dialect, is not an option. Books must be written in literary Arabic, which I don’t know well 
enough.”100 
In addition, Kashua published three successful novels. However, in contrast to his 
novelistic explorations, within Israel people know him mostly from Avoda Aravit (2007), or in 
English, Arab Labor. Arab Labor is a satirical bilingual TV series written by Kashua himself. 
Arab Labour colloquially signifies “shoddy or second-rate work”101. The series focuses on 
Amjad Alyean, a Palestinian journalist and Israeli citizen in search of his identity. Kashua 
satirizes the cultural divide by having his characters play with and thereby abrade against 
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religious, cultural and political differences to daringly depict the mixed society that is in Israel. 
This show marked a milestone on Israeli television as the first program to present Palestinian 
characters speaking Arabic on primetime, and it generated unrelenting controversy between the 
Arab and Israeli media.  
Kashua’s works often feature events from his own personal life, or the lives of the people 
around him. It can be seen very clearly in his books and even more so in the TV show Arab 
Labour, where the protagonist, Amjad Alyean, is a Palestinian journalist that works at an Israeli 
newspaper illustrating the insertion of both Kashua’s occupation as well as the kind of 
publications he worked for. In addition, Kashua’s decision to move to West Jerusalem, to an all-
Jewish apartment complex, and send his kids to Jewish Israeli schools, is incorporated into the 
protagonist’s narrative underscoring the way in which the biographical content propels the 
narrative. When Kashua was asked for the source of the inspiration for Arab Labor, his reply 
confirmed these observations: “I’m in love with myself, it is not new that I use events and 
encounters from my personal life in order to describe the situation in Israel”.102 Kashua starred 
the role of himself in two of his four novels and his weekly column in the Haaretz Israeli 
newspaper. Although Kashua acknowledges his initial hesitation at the thought of  “taking the 
risk and writing a bilingual show that has an Arab protagonist,” it was the fact that Israeli 
society, saturated with a sense of entrenched racism, could handle “the additional solvent”. It is 
noteworthy that Kashua’s artistic endeavor was executed with an, arguably deliberate, reference 
to the “Melting Pot” wherein the dominant ingredient, that is the Israeli portion of the compound, 
simply assimilates and, by this process, subsumes minorities within its oppressive grasp. With 
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this incendiary agenda in mind, it begs the question whether this show would not only receive 
adequate funding but also the reception by the predominantly Israeli audience. It became 
increasingly clear that Kashua’s risk was worthwhile.  
 There were multiple factors that played a role in the success of Arab labor despite its 
riskiness. Kashua explains that the reason behind the success of the show to bring Arab 
characters on prime time and to openly expose stereotypes is a combination between the 
intelligent regulation of dosages of softness and leveraging a permanent feeling of otherness and 
manipulative usage of stereotypes and contrasts. The non-stereotypical Arabism, helped to attract 
the Israeli public to the characters. That was the goal of the first season to humanise Arab 
characters and bring them to the center of the Israeli cultural salon. Kashua explains: “I don’t 
know if I had aspirations beyond to try and humanise the Arabic family.”103 Another factor as to 
why the show was well perceived and massively viewed by Israelis on the width of the spectrum 
is because Kashua claims that he knows the limits of the discourse and that he exercised this 
awareness, as a journalist in Haaretz, to gauge the limits of the Israeli mainstream viewer’s 
aesthetic appetite. He subsequently realizes that what he means by the ‘mainstream’ or ‘average’ 
Israeli viewer and their capacity to digest content refers exclusively to the left wing Israeli.   
Kashua is often perceived in Israel as the different Arab, or, the ‘modern’ Arab. As a 
consequence, in his works, he attempts to portray Arab characters the way he conceives of them, 
and not in the way they are perceived in the Israeli public. Nevertheless, he has to be careful with 
the way he constructs his scenes to match what the Israeli viewer can absorb. To substantiate, 
when he brings up issues like Memorial Day and its significance to Amjad, as a Palestinian 
Israeli, he has to do it in a specific way. As Kashua puts it, a move as explained above requires 
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“calculated caution”. 104 This is because, the Israeli public still struggles with identification with 
the meaning of the Nakba on prime time, since all expressions of sadness and mourning during 
Memorial and Independence Day are perceived as expressions of obliterating the Israeli state. 
Therefore, he has to present it in a crafted manner that would make the Nakba / Independence 
Day, for Amjad and his family painful and unfortunate, and simultaneously reach the Israeli 
viewer and transmit the message to him and make him watch the episode till the end even though 
he shivers at the sound of the term Nakba. Kashua’s sketches require his viewers to not only 
participate in the dialogue but also persist through the dialogue.  
In Arab Labor, Kashua deals with very important issues that shape life in Israel. It can be 
looked at as a form of social commentary on Israeli norms. For example, Kashua is highly 
opposed to the idea that people can only marry of their own religion. Intermarriage is an 
extremely sensitive matter in Israel not only between Arabs and Jews, but also between Arabs 
and Christians. In the show, Kashua introduces the story of a mixed couple which becomes the 
nucleus of the narrative. He follows their relationship, its evolution and the concomitant 
difficulties. The two characters are Amal and Meir; they are very different from one another. 
Amal is an Arab feminist - human rights lawyer who studied in the US, and moved back to 
Jerusalem afterwards. She strongly opposes the “Israeli government and its policies”. Amal is 
juxtaposed with Meir, a Jewish Israeli who comes from a center-right wing family in Bat Yam. 
He is Amjad’s coworker and best friend, he is a photographer, that claims not to care about 
politics. The two fall in love despite the impossibility of their circumstances. Even though they 
loved each other immensely, there was no way in which they could avoid the environment and 
reality surrounding them. Thus, the core of the majority of their fights and arguments derived 
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from the fact that she was Arab and he was Jewish. However, it is Kashua’s use of the artistic 
space as a realm which allows for these cultural impossibilities to not only be conceived of but 
also experienced vicariously by its viewers. These experiences engender discourse, which may 
be limited to the realm of media, but allow for socio-historical issues between Arab Palestinians 
and Jewish Israeli to surface. Furthermore, Kashua intertwines the history of the region with the 
narratives of his characters so as to layer this fictional work with an air of meaningful 
verisimilitude.  
 One of the most powerful scenes, which exemplifies the power of the dialogic space 
within an artistic work, involves Meir and Amal in episode 8 of the second season: the episode of 
Memorial Day. In this episode, Amal and Meir are broken up because of a political argument 
that they had, and Meir is trying restore parity in their relationship. Meir follows Amal and waits 
for her to leave her house to talk to her. She asks him to stop trying, because she feels that if she 
is with him, it's not her “natural place,” she tells him that there are things that go beyond 
emotions, because they come from two different places. She tells him that their relationship does 
not have hope, especially three days before the Nakba. Meir responds to her: “what do you 
mean? Is it because of the Jewish-Arab issue? I don’t care about this, I don’t care about all these 
politics, I don’t care about the Nakba or 1948 or…” the siren for Memorial day rings, and Meir 
goes silent and reflects. Amal looks him in the eyes and leaves. Meir stays, standing in silence, 
commemorating the fallen Israeli soldiers. This demonstrates the manner in which each scene is 
imbued with political themes which engender discourse that, whilst being conspicuously absent 
from everyday discourse, must be grappled with by the viewers of the show. At the end of the 
episode, circumstances shift, and Meir replaces Amjad who was asked to light the torch of 
Independence at Mount Herzl. He takes this opportunity to express his love to Amal, because the 
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event is broadcasted all over Israel, and he was sure Amal would be watching.  
In this scene, Kashua points out on the difficulty to mingle and cross cultures that 
exceeds politics and policy. It is a painful scene that tackles the fact of the inherent differences 
that the two nations were founded on. But at the same time he wants to find a solution for it. He 
doesn’t want intermarriage to remain hypothetical and on the margins. He shows that while he is 
aware of the difficulty and the impossibility of the task, there can be a way to go around it. He 
uses the metaphor of Meir expressing his love to Amal on top of Mount Herzl, in front of the 
whole nation. The Arab and Israeli society is opposed to intermarriage. It is one of the biggest 
taboos in Israel, even if the household is not necessarily religious, when it comes to 
intermarriage, there is a red line. But when the viewer watches Amal and Meir, and follows their 
interaction and the development of their relationship, can’t help but want them to end up 
together.  As a consequence, this creates a gap between the viewer’s desire as a distant observer, 
to his opinions and prejudices as a member of the Israeli society. This gap makes the viewer 
reevaluate his stances and his beliefs. This interaction with the viewer is what Kashua is working 
to achieve, because it enhances the dialogue and the two-way process of Palestinian Arab - 
Israeli interaction and push it to another level. This is because after watching the show, the 
Jewish Israeli becomes more informed of the situation of the Arab Israeli, and can have a more 
coherent correspondence with him, as the state’s natural other.  This scene is emblematic of 
Kashua’s artistic vision which is undergirded by his broader political agenda: translating the 
paucity of socio-political discourse by producing a dialogue between artist and viewer which 
promotes engagement and raises awareness across the silent masses – allowing for dialogues 
about integration to be represented in the form of a narrative. 
Sami Smooha sees Arab Labor as a TV show that functions as “delicate subversion” 
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under the status quo. He explains, the show is not trying to strengthen the stereotypes, he 
deconstructs the stereotypes, while Kashua is being attentive to the dosage and padding the TV 
screen, he allows the Israeli Jew to be more open and distinguish between an Arab Palestinians 
from inside the Green Line and outside the Green Line. The Jewish Israeli becomes more open to 
accept and hear out the Palestinian Israeli citizen and admit there is discrimination against him. 
The show presents the complexity of the process of Israelization that the Arabs go through. It 
presents the distortions of this process through a small dosage of Palestinization. The process of 
Palestinization doesn’t appear that much in the show, because it is something that the Jewish 
Israeli viewer would distance himself from, so it is understandable why the show doesn’t put an 
emphasis on the Palestinization process that Arab Israelis go through.105  
Arabs in Israel have a complex identity with a Palestinian component, a pan-Arab 
component, a religious component and a civic Israeli component. Palestinization and 
Israelization are not necessarily contradictory. They can reinforce one another; the way it was 
with the younger generation of the Arab Israelis. The younger generation became more 
Palestinian in their self-identity and at the same time they went through a process of Israelization 
in terms of culture and their day to day life. Laurence Louer has said that: “[...] to identify 
oneself as a Palestinian is neither to reject Israeli citizenship nor to close oneself off culturally 
from Israel.”106 It is immensely challenging to have these two identities in Israel because it is a 
highly politicized and polarized society where Palestinian nationalism is greatly feared and 
rejected by Israeli Jews and the Israeli government. In 2013, MK Ayelet Shaked (The Jewish 
Home) proposed the “Law of Nationalism”, which is the basic law that will pronounce Israel as 
the state of the Jewish people. In this law it is proposed that whoever identifies with Palestinian 
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organizations or movements that don’t recognize the right to the state of Israel to exist, would be 
convicted. According to this law, holding the Palestinian flag in public is also a crime. This law 
prevents Palestinians from integrating in Israel without fully divorcing the Palestinian 
component from their identity. 
An in-depth look into the contours of Amjad Alyean, in light of “the Law of 
Nationalism,” underlines Kashoua’s politicization of his protagonist who exemplifies the 
complexity of the question of identity for the Palestinian Arab in Israel. Amjad, the protagonist is 
a Palestinian Arab Israeli citizen who tries desperately to get close to the world of Israelis, 
meaning, the Jewish Israelis. He loves the holidays of the Jews and is very much influenced by 
the actions of the Jews, their lifestyle and their day to day decisions. He aspires for his daughter, 
Maya, to be just like the Jewish kids, so he decides to send her to a Jewish school in Jerusalem. 
Amjad is the most extreme character in the show. He is very extreme in wanting to resemble the 
Ashkenazi Jew, therefore, very extreme in wanting to distance himself from his Arabness. Most 
of the stereotypes are passed through his persona. He presents the stereotype that Arabs have 
problems with water and can’t swim, and that Arabs can’t play classical music, and that Arabs 
are afraid of dogs because dogs don’t like Arabs. Kashua, in this instance, uses the self mockery 
as a rhetorical tool. These scenes are supposed to make fun of Amjad, but in reality it makes fun 
of the viewer that believes these stereotypes, and the satire appears very clear in these places. In 
an article about the sitcom wrote Mendelson Maoz and Steir-Livny, Hebrew Literature 
professors, shed light on the Jewification process undergone by the show’s leading character, 
Amjad. They analyze a range of surreal scenes depicting Amjad’s pathetic attempts to be a part 
of the Jewish world, but which repeatedly prove “the impossible situation of an Arab in Israel, 
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belonging to two worlds while simultaneously being shunned from both.”107  While the rules of 
this particular television genre dictate a humorous presentation of this vexing problem, the 
researchers show that themes relating to the fate of the Jewish people, also appear in Kashua’s 
literary works, shaped in a tragic way 
Moving from Kashua and Shammas, the next artist this paper is going to explore is Lucy 
Aharish. A news presenter, reporter and a television host. Aharish is also an Arab citizen of 
Israel, but unlike Shammas and Kashua, she doesn’t call herself Palestinian, even though her 
grandparents experienced the Nakba to its fullest. She says:  “I have a country, and I have a 
passport. When I am abroad, I say I am Israeli.”108 
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Lucy Aharish 
Lucy Aharish, was born in Dimona, a Jewish desert town in Israel's periphery, located in 
the south of Israel. Her parents are originally from Nazareth, they moved to Dimona as a result 
of her dad’s work. Aharish studied social sciences and theater at the Hebrew University in 
Jerusalem. After that, she studied journalism at the Koteret School in Tel Aviv and then interned 
for a year and a half at a school in Germany. In 2007, she became the first Arab to present the 
news on mainstream Israeli television when she was hired by Channel 10109. As The National 
describes her in an article published in 2009:”Aharish was the bright new female on the block 
and one of the key players in a circle of young Arab-Israelis blazing a trail into Jewish salons 
through TV sets, movie screens and glossy magazines.”110 
One of the most significant events in Aharish’s life and professional career was the 
lighting of one of the beacons on Independence Day at Mount Herzl: the burial place of the man 
who envisioned Israel and became the nightmare of the Palestinians, not far from the ruins of the 
Palestinian Arab village of Deir Yassin and the apartheid separation wall. This event generated 
serious dispute within the Palestinian Arab community in Israel, because the Israeli Day of 
Independence is the Palestinian Nakba, where the Palestinians mourn and commemorate the loss 
of their land and loved ones. The Palestinians considered Lucy’s participation in such event as 
shameful. There were also voices from the Israeli right wing who claim that as an Arab, Aharish 
is not sufficiently loyal to the state and she shouldn’t have been given this honor. These 
extremist right wing groups led by Benzi Gopstein, a follower of the late Rabbi Meir Kahane, is 
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the head of Lehava, a “nut-job”111 organization that seeks to prevent assimilation, protested 
Aharish’s lighting of the torch all around Israel.112 Aharish was nominated to be one of the 
lighters of the torch as a reward for her promoting of “social pluralism and positions that call for 
coexistence in the country.” Gideon Levy’s commentary about Aharish’s participation of the 
event was as such: “In the eyes of the Zionist establishment, Aharish is a good Arab. It turns out 
that in our enlightened state, a good Arab is an invisible Arab, when it comes to his identity. 
Why was Aharish chosen? Because she – how shall we put it – does not look Arab, sound Arab 
or dress like an Arab. The “coexistence” of the establishment that chose her is actually 
“uniexistence,” everyone in its image.” 113 This was a transformational event in Aharish’s career. 
She was highly appreciated by most Israeli Jews and highly condemned by most Arabs in Israel 
and Palestine.  
The question of being a “good Arab” is problematized by the Israeli regime’s policies 
towards its citizens which are often contradictory. This is because on the one hand, it is claiming 
that it's aiming to create a “new, local, Israeli Arab identity divorced from Palestinian 
nationalism” so this new Arab will be able to fit into the Israeli society and be good citizens. On 
the other hand, the Arabs are not really given a platform to serve as good citizens, because they 
are always looked at as a fifth column and a possible threat. As long as this attitude is sustained, 
the discriminatory acts against Arabs in Israel are going to remain justifiable. Sammy Smooha 
aptly articulates the issue as follows:  
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A "good citizen" contributes to the state far beyond observing law and order, paying 
taxes, serving in the military, voting in elections, and engaging in routine public life. In 
terms of the fulfillment of these obligations of an ordinary citizen, there is no substantive 
difference between Jew and Arab, with the exception of military service. However, the 
Israeli "good citizen" not only excels in various voluntary activities, but also in 
contributing to state goals, including the strengthening of national security, the increase 
of the Jewish majority, the cultivation of the Hebrew language, the development of 
Jewish culture, the ingathering of the exiles, the settlement of the country (by Jews), the 
geographical dispersion of the (Jewish) population, the reinforcement of the relations 
with Diaspora Jewry, and the advancement of economic independence. The possibility 
that an Israeli Arab could become a "good citizen" is thus extremely limited; as much as 
one may try, by the very fact of being an Arab, having Arab children, using the Arabic 
language, and sustaining the Arab culture, one is prevented from contributing to the 
realization of most of the Jewish objectives of the state.114 
Growing up in Dimona, a city typically known for its right wing leanings, had major 
effects on Aharish’s life. She went to a Jewish school where she was the only Arab in the class. 
“In high school I was often teased and sometimes even beaten up,” Aharish confesses in an 
interview.115 One time there was graffiti scrawled on to her school's toilet wall: "We don't want 
filthy Arabs in our school." On the other hand, in almost every interview at the beginning of her 
growing presence in the media, Aharish never failed to miss an opportunity to narrate her 
experience of surviving a Palestinian “suicide bombing” during a visit with her family to Gaza 
when she was 10 years old. Moreover, she consistently emphasized the negative impact it left on 
her. In most interviews, Aharish refers to this incident as surviving a suicide bomber’s attack; in 
other interviews she refers to it as surviving a Molotov Cocktail attack. Aharish makes sure to 
share her traumatic experience with the Palestinians in the occupied territories to pass the 
message to the Israeli public that she, as an Israeli Arab, feels their pain and fear of Palestinians. 
The proceedings of this event were even broadcasted as Aharish was walking to light the beacon 
of Independence Day in a bizarre case of simultaneous propaganda and the commemoration of 
Aharish’s narrative. 
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 In order for Aharish to reach a level or a space where she can talk comfortably about her 
opinions, she had to win the credibility of her audience first. She had to present herself as the 
“good Arab”, as Gideon Levy, a left wing Israeli journalist who has a weekly column in Haaretz 
newspaper defined the term :”The deal is obvious: If you act like Jews, talk like them and think 
like them, you will be considered good Arabs, and maybe even Israelis. Because that is how we 
want you to be – like us. Not like the Zoabis. In other words, you are better off 
assimilating.”116Aharish being a ‘good Arab’, doesn’t think that Arabs in Israel are discriminated 
against, and if at all, no more than the discrimination of the Ethiopian and Mizrahi Jews. She 
claims that the Arabs are not victims of systematic injustice.117  She had to show the average 
Israeli viewer that she is standing on the same side.  As Rogel Alpher, a journalist who writes for 
Haaretz newspaper, put it in his article The Tragedy of Lucy Aharish, Israel’s Neutralized Arab 
Talk-show Host: “Aharish talks like an Israeli centrist, somewhere between the Zionist Union’s 
Isaac Herzog and Yesh Atid’s Yair Lapid. In other words, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas 
has to stop inciting and the Palestinians have to stop stabbing. All this started because of the 
tensions over the Al-Aqsa Mosque on the Temple Mount without any link to the Palestinians’ 
despair.”118 
 Aharish is admired by a vast majority of the Israeli public for a number of reasons: she 
has a charismatic character and is articulate. However, the most important factor that plays into 
this admiration might be a little less apparent, and it is that she is a tool that calms and salves the 
Jewish Israeli consciousness. The mere fact of providing her with a platform to speak functions 
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as their required share that they have to contribute in order to preserve their self-representation as 
democratic by allowing for open discourse with a spokesperson ostensibly representing the 
marginalized minority, therefore, advocating for a two-way process; a process undermined by the 
fact that the voices of the other are not only chosen by the Israelis but also only speak to 
perpetuate the dominant narrative within the “Melting Pot”. Aharish’s case is a win-win situation 
for the mainstream Israeli public. Thus, by furthering their narrative, she validates and reinforces 
the prevalent Israeli doctrine as the representative of the minority. Aharish sees that “she’s the 
one who truly represents the silent majority of Israeli Arabs — she, not the MKs elected to 
represent them.” 119 Jack Khoury, an Arab journalist who writes for Haaretz claims that: 
“broadcaster Lucy Aharish has become the joker the Israeli media pull out of the deck to attack 
Israeli Arab MKs and other voices deemed ‘extremist.’”120 This is because Aharish is an Arab 
who isn’t afraid to express an opinion that is inconsistent with the voice of the Arab street, 
particularly that of the political leadership. Khoury sees that the Israeli mainstream perceives the 
phenomena of Aharish as such: “We have a popular senior broadcaster who can represent a 
different, sane, and pleasing position, and show the face of Israeli democracy.  MKs Ahmed Tibi 
or Haneen Zoabi, not the Communists and not the Islamic State. Lucy Aharish is a loyal citizen 
who is not ungrateful. And we are all citizens of the State of Israel, loyal to its citizens, Jews and 
Arabs alike. An island of sanity and democracy in the Middle East. A villa in the jungle.”121 
Aharish blends in seamlessly at Channel 2;  she has the qualities that make her qualified 
to fit in. She is fluent in Hebrew and has no accent, she feels very comfortable around Jews; she 
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talks like them and has similar sense of humor. However, her moderation can also be seen as her 
tragedy. This is because it is very easy to complain about her in newspapers like Haaretz. But she 
doesn’t have a choice, because if she wants a career in Israeli TV, she doesn’t have the luxury of 
appearing differently. Some will argue that if Aharish didn’t express these views, she wouldn’t 
have been able to host a current-affairs program on Channel 2. Alpher echoes this and says:” It’s 
not as if Aharish has a choice. There’s no maneuver room in the range of expression she has 
been awarded. If she underwent a transformation that had her expressing militant nationalist 
Palestinian views, she’d be fired on the spot.” Aharish is somewhat aware of that, she once 
expressed that in an interview saying :”“when I was the nice Arab girl that read the news and 
said good evening everyone, two Qassam rockets just landed in Sderot, then said have a good 
night with a polite smile on my face, this was okay. But the moment I started expressing my 
opinions, here apparently I cross the lines.”122 
There was a shift in Aharish’s language when talking about the Arab population 
throughout the course of her career. In a documentary that was made in 2013, the time where 
Aharish starting getting recognition in the Israeli media and culture, featured the story of five 
Israeli Arab women. The common denominator between them is that they are all struggling to fit 
in the Israeli and the Arab society. Aharish’s part of this documentary evolved around the 
lingering question pertaining to her own as well as her two sisters marital status. Aharish’s 
parents do not approve of their daughters marrying a man that is not Muslim. Aharish and her 
sisters are very much uncomfortable with this fact, because they think that if they marry a 
Muslim man, they will end up giving up the personality and character that they built, because 
according to them, all Muslim men are oppressive and won’t let their wives be independent or 
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pursue a career. In this documentary, Aharish constantly makes generalizations about the Arab 
society in Israel as a whole and the character of the Arab Muslim man in particular. Later on, in 
Aharish’s current career, she condemns the people who make generalizations about Arabs.   
Aharish had a different way than Shammas and Kashua in presenting herself in the Israeli 
media. Shammas and Kashua, through their work, demanded integration as their first demand 
and desire. Though Aharish, while maybe aspiring the same end, took a different approach. She 
choose to assimilate first and prove herself as a “good Arab” so later on she can demand 
integration. So even though when she started appearing first on TV, she won the titles of being 
the first Arab broadcasting on Israeli TV, she was only being assimilative, and fulfilling her duty 
just like any other Israeli Jewish journalist would. Without bringing the Arab component of her 
identity to the screen, and if at all, it would be to condemn it. Many critics used the term “pet 
Arab” to describe her. Thus, in this phase of Aharish’s career, she was merely part of the existing 
Israeli monologic discourse, because she was echoing what has already been said and not 
contributing a new voice to the conversation. 
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Conclusion 
 The Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel have gone through a number of different stages in 
their position and function in the Israeli state throughout history. They transitioned from being 
silent and silenced during the period of “political quietism,” where they were afraid to express 
their Palestinian identity, to  a socio-political stance where they demanded to be recognized as a 
national minority with collective rights. This voice of dissent persists even today. The “1948 
Palestinians” became active Israeli citizens and they remain dissatisfied with their status as 
second-class citizens which is the rationale underlying their call to equality in relation to the 
Israeli Jews. Even though the Israeli state has programs to promote the integration of the Arab 
minority into the state’s sphere, this paper has demonstrated how integration in Israel is 
monologic and therefore purely assimilative. The redefinition of integration into a two-way 
process is crucial for not only the beginning of the process but also to frame the dialogues that 
are characteristic of the process of peacemaking in the region. 
The two-way process requires these two societies in question to work together in order to 
preserve each ‘compound’ in the solution of the society which further illustrates the failure of the 
“Melting Pot” especially with regard to the reoriented definition of integration put forth in this 
paper. The scheme of the dialogue does not mean that the two sides, Arab Palestinian Israelis and 
Jewish Israelis, have to reach a full agreement on the entirety of disputes they share revolving 
around the Palestinian Israeli conflict. Unfortunately, after 69 years since the start of the conflict, 
it is still very early to talk about any sort of conclusive agreement. A socio-political consensus 
cannot be reached without both sides first recognizing each other, and more importantly 
acknowledging the suffering and history of the other. The dialogic relationship between 
reader/spectator and author, manifest in Shammas, Kashua and Aharish’s methodology, 
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humanizes the Arab Palestinian population in Israel by illustrating the narratives of the socio-
politically oppressed national minority.  
Shammas achieves this by provoking the definition of Israeliness through writing and 
demanding a share in the Hebrew language. Shammas used the Hebrew language as it was his 
own. This form of Hebrew has a Palestinian influence at its core and simultaneously grapples 
with biblical allusions and appropriations from in fact, early European Hebrew writings that were 
the modus that anticipated the establishment of the state of Israel. Shammas claims that he, as a 
Palestinian Arab and Israeli citizen, is as righteous as any other Jewish Hebrew speaker to claim 
the Hebrew language as his own. By doing that, he introduces the Israeli Hebrew readers to the 
Palestinian history and story in their own idiom and naturally enforces the Palestinian narrative 
in the Israeli artistic arena. The establishment of the artistic space engenders the re-understanding 
of integration as a two-way process which is mirrored in the interaction between reader and 
writer.  
Kashua, also a Hebrew writer, works to achieve the dialogic encounter in a different 
manner. In Israel, he is portrayed as the man of the people and then the artist. In Arab Labor, he 
managed to attract great numbers of Palestinian Israelis and Jewish Israelis to not only be 
witness but to also engage with the story of an Arab family in Israel. By bringing the Arabic 
language to the commercial Israeli TV, this shift from a monologic space, dominated by Hebrew, 
becomes dialogic due to the introduction of the Arabic language which is an official language in 
Israel, despite the fact that it is often blatantly negated and disregarded.123   
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Aharish, assumed a distinctive position in bringing the “good Arab” into the center of the 
Israeli media. Aharish, following suit, demanded a platform to contain her own and other similar 
voices into the Israeli cultural sphere. She successfully managed to capture the attention of the 
Israeli public who openly recognized her as an Arab Israeli, with an emphasis on the Israeli facet 
of her identity. Aharish created her public persona whilst divorcing herself completely from the 
Arab Palestinian identity. She, unlike Shammas or Kashua, embarked upon a path, to secure 
dialogic integration, by adulterating her endeavor evident in the assimilationist guide under 
which she rose to popularity.  
This paper advocates for the creation of artistic spaces which are dialogic in nature. 
These spaces, which allow for the voice of the marginalized Arab Palestinian minority to surface, 
portray the polarization and entrenched hypocrisy, considering Israel’s self-representation as a 
democracy, across the Arab and Jewish populations. It is noteworthy that these artistic spaces 
permeate throughout both Arabic-Palestinian and Hebrew-Israeli culture which underlines the 
importance of the dialogue between the two communities emerging in this space. Nevertheless, 
the language of expression, as exemplified by the artists chosen in this paper, remains in the 
language of the dominant narrative, Hebrew. The paper’s methodology, which composes a 
triptych of artistic voices, reflects the need for a transposal of the dialogic artistic space into both 
the political processes that will underlie the integration of the Arab Palestinians but also, and 
fundamentally, the redefinition of a two-way process of integration that requires listening, 
dialogue and exchange in order to challenge the socio-political status quo. It is indispensable to 
note that it is not agreement that is the primary goal of this artistic and, by extension, political 
enterprise; it is the movement away from diplomatic dialogue to a space where open-dialogue is 
inspired by the principles which have redefined the notion of integration itself: a two-way 
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process where the socio-political condition hinges upon dialogue, rather than the reiteration of 
monologues whose echoes continue to haunt the forthcoming generations of this region. The 
voices of discontent and frustration, if not confronted by dialogic processes, will sentence the 
Arab Palestinian Israelis to subsist with the Israeli regime’s tyranny which seals their ineluctable 
fate.  
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